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 Non-Technical Summary 
Man is an overconfident breed.  Overconfidence arises when knowledge perception 
exceeds its reality.  While we should not be overly surprised if individuals operating 
outside their natural domains fall prey to this flaw, naturally it is to be hoped that, 
for an individual making his living in a certain field of expertise, the actual 
knowledge level is high, and the perception of this level accurate.  Unfortunately the 
reality is that experts can be quite overconfident. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine both the statics and dynamics of 
overconfidence of stock market forecasters.  The survey instrument employed is the 
ZEW Finanzmarkttest.  The latter is a monthly survey of financial market 
practitioners in Germany.  Respondents are asked for 90% confidence intervals for 
the level of the DAX six months ahead.  The availability of not just point estimates 
but also confidence intervals allows for a careful exploration of overconfidence in 
both its static and dynamic manifestations.   
We first investigate whether the respondent group as a whole is overconfident.  Next 
we explore whether people learn from past successes and failures, and from work 
experience in financial markets.  Finally we consider whether the market as a whole 
becomes overconfident in response to high past returns.   
To preview, we first conclude that market forecasters are egregiously overconfident.  
Second, success, measured by correct prediction leads to increased overconfidence.  
Third, market experience, which is symptomatic of past success, is associated with 
higher levels of overconfidence.  And, fourth, the market does learn to be 
overconfident through past collective success. 
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Abstract 
As a group, market forecasters are egregiously overconfident.  In conformity to the 
dynamic model of overconfidence of Gervais and Odean (2001), successful 
forecasters become more overconfident. What’s more, more experienced forecasters 
have “learned to be overconfident,” and hence are more susceptible to this 
behavioral flaw than their less experienced peers.  It is not just individuals who are 
affected.  Markets also become more overconfident when market returns have been 
high. 
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1 Introduction 
Man is an overconfident breed.  Overconfidence arises when knowledge perception 
exceeds its reality.  While we should not be overly surprised if individuals operating 
outside their natural domains fall prey to this flaw, naturally it is to be hoped that, 
for an individual making his living in a certain field of expertise, the actual 
knowledge level is high, and the perception of this level accurate.  Unfortunately the 
reality is that experts can be quite overconfident.1 
Theory suggests that overconfidence is likely to be more prevalent if feedback is 
infrequent and ambiguous (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977)).  Based on 
this insight, one might expect overconfidence to be less common for frequent 
forecasters of unambiguous events.  That is to say, professional forecasters, whether 
they are meteorologists or sports handicappers, might be expected to develop a 
better sense of their knowledge and limitations through experience, and be less 
overconfident than neophytes.  Another example of an expert prognosticator is an 
individual who earns her living in part by making stock market forecasts.  One 
might expect that fairly frequent unambiguous feedback, coupled with the fact that 
poor performers are routinely weeded out in financial markets, should lead those 
surviving being good at their craft and developing a sense of their knowledge in line 
with its reality.   
A careful examination of this issue requires some clarity on how overconfidence can 
best be measured, and why it is usually viewed as a negative attribute.  
Unfortunately universal agreement does not exist on what overconfidence is.  The 
better-than-average effect (e.g., Svenson (1981)) stems from the observation that 
more than 50% of the population seems to think that they are more skilled at driving 
than average; their children are smarter than average; they can choose stocks better 
than the average trader; and so on.  Those subject to illusion of control (Langer 
(1975)) believe that they can somehow exercise more control over events such as 
avoiding accidents, winning lotteries, buying hot stocks or avoiding poorly 
performing stocks than can realistically be possible. 
These two approaches however do not lend themselves to easy quantification of 
overconfidence though, so a third approach to its measurement which is more 
convenient in this regard, namely miscalibration, is preferable.  In a calibration test 
(Lichtenstein et al (1982), Keren (1991) and McClelland and Bolger (1994)), when 
individuals are asked to construct x% confidence intervals for currently (or soon to 
be) known magnitudes such as the height of Mount Everest (or the level of the Dow 
in a month), a percentage of individuals usually markedly below x% produce 
intervals that bracket the true answer.  Another reason for preferring the 
                                           
1  See Barber and Odean (1999) for numerous references. 
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miscalibration approach is that the new theoretical models (e.g., Kyle and Wang 
(1997) and Odean (1998)), in which overconfidence plays center stage, utilize a 
definition of overconfidence that is most akin to miscalibration.  Still, it must be 
acknowledged that there is no ideal overconfidence metric, a point which picks up 
resonance when it is observed that people’s overconfidence scores using different 
metrics often have low correlations (Glaser and Weber (2005)). 
What damage is wrought by overconfidence?  A good example is Odean (1998), 
who has formulated a behavioral model that suggests that overconfident investors, 
believing that they possess greater precision on security valuations than is merited, 
trade too much and thereby lower their wealth (and expected utility).  The intuition 
is clear: the more certain you are of your view, the less credence you will accord 
those of others, and the more likely you will be to transact at a price perceived 
favorable to your view.  Barber and Odean (2000) demonstrate that investors who 
trade more suffer the consequences by receiving lower risk-adjusted returns.  And 
Deaves, Lüders and Luo (2005) have produced experimental evidence supporting 
the direct correlation between overconfidence and trading activity.2  In a corporate 
finance context, it has been demonstrated (e.g., Malmendier and Tate (2005)) that 
CEOs sometimes make sub-optimal investment decisions if they are prone to 
overconfidence.  What about economy-wide forecasts, such as the level of the stock 
market?  Needless to say, since both investors and corporate decision-makers use 
forecasts for portfolio formation and planning purposes, a poor sense of the market’s 
true volatility can inflict egregious harm. 
The dynamics of overconfidence is clearly an important issue.  It is logical to think 
that if we recall our successes and failures equally clearly, over time we should 
obtain an accurate view.  Experience should make us wise.  On the other hand, the 
prevalence and persistence of overconfidence suggest that forces able to eliminate it 
are weak.  The reality is that we prefer to forget what did not go our way: this is 
called cognitive dissonance.  Working in tandem, self-attribution bias leads us to 
remember our successes with great clarity, if not embellishment (Fischoff (1982), 
Langer and Roth (1975), Miller and Ross (1975) and Taylor and Brown (1988)).  
And confirmatory bias, the tendency to search out evidence consistent with one’s 
prior beliefs and to ignore conflicting data, may also contribute (Forsythe, Nelson, 
Neumann and Wright (1992)).  A strict efficient markets view of the world would 
seem to argue that those fooling themselves in this way will be driven from the 
marketplace, but some have called this into question (Hirshleifer and Luo (2001)). 
                                           
2  Also working in an experimental setting, Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget (2005) are unable 
to conclude that overconfidence leads to an increase in trading intensity, though they do find 
that it serves to significantly reduce profits.  Glaser and Weber (2003), combining a survey and 
naturally-occurring market data, document the correlation between the better-than-average 
effect variant of overconfidence and trading activity. 
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The dynamic nature of overconfidence is stressed in the models of Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001) and Gervais and Odean (2001).  In the 
latter paper, which operates in a multi-period setting, past successes, through the 
mechanism of self-attribution bias, exacerbate overconfidence (while past failures 
tend to be ignored).  The inference is that those who have had the good fortune of 
being successful in their fields might for a time be more overconfident than those 
who have just entered.  Eventually however experience should reveal to people their 
true knowledge level. 
While overconfidence can afflict individuals, it can also be endemic in markets.  The 
most likely trigger is high past market returns.  Statman, Thorley and Vorkink 
(2004) show that lagged market returns are correlated with increases in trading 
activity.  This constitutes indirect evidence of an increase in overconfidence through 
self-attribution bias, since behavioral models typically associate overconfidence with 
excessive trading.  Glaser and Weber (2004) investigate whether individual investors 
adjust volume more in response to market returns or own-portfolio returns.  They 
find that those who keep track of their own portfolios are more influenced by the 
latter, while those less aware are more likely to be influenced by market returns.  
While this line of research is suggestive, it relies on using volume as a proxy for 
overconfidence.  Clearly it would be helpful to investigate whether lagged market 
movements and aggregate overconfidence are directly related. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine both the statics and dynamics of 
overconfidence of stock market forecasters.  The survey instrument employed is the 
ZEW Finanzmarkttest.  The latter is a monthly survey of financial market 
practitioners in Germany.  Respondents are asked for 90% confidence intervals for 
the level of the DAX six months ahead.  While an analysis of forecasting accuracy is 
far from unusual, our purpose here is quite different.  The availability of not just 
point estimates but also confidence intervals allows for a careful exploration of 
overconfidence in both its static and dynamic manifestations.  Graham and Harvey 
(2003) make use of a somewhat similar dataset of CFO forecasts and confidence 
intervals for the U.S. stock market.  Their focus is not on overconfidence, however, 
as they investigate what can be learned about ex ante equity premiums and the 
relationship between risk and return. 
We first investigate whether the respondent group as a whole is overconfident.  Next 
we explore whether people learn from past successes and failures, and from work 
experience in financial markets.  Finally we consider whether the market as a whole 
becomes overconfident in response to high past returns.  To preview, we first 
conclude that market forecasters are egregiously overconfident.  Second, success, 
measured by correct prediction leads to increased overconfidence.  Third, market 
experience, which is symptomatic of past success, is associated with higher levels of 
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overconfidence.  And, fourth, the market does learn to be overconfident through past 
collective success. 
Section 2 describes the ZEW Finanzmarkttest.  The next section specifies the 
hypotheses to be tested.  Section 4 details the key empirical findings.  And the final 
section concludes. 
2. The ZEW Finanzmarkttest survey 
The ZEW Finanzmarkttest is a monthly survey of about 350 financial market 
practitioners in Germany. Most of these individuals work for a commercial bank, 
investment bank, insurance company or investment department of a large German 
company.  Each month, beginning in 1991, participants have been asked to predict a 
series of key macroeconomic and financial market variables for the key 
industrialized economies as of six months in the future.  For example, participants 
are asked to predict the inflation rate, long-term and short-term interest rates, 
economic activity, and stock market levels for these countries.  Until recently 
questions only asked for direction: that is, rise/fall/unchanged.  This questionnaire 
forms the basis for the well-known ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, an 
indicator which, together with the ifo Business Climate index, is one of the most 
important and most closely followed economic indicators in Germany.3 
Of course in Germany one of the key magnitudes to forecast is the level of the DAX.  
Specifically, the DAX is an index composed of the 30 largest and most important 
German companies traded on the German Stock Exchange in Frankfurt.  Starting in 
February 2003, ZEW survey respondents were asked to provide, in additional to a 
directional forecast, a quantitative one for the DAX.  Specifically, point estimates for 
the DAX six months in the future, as well as lower and upper bounds forming 90% 
confidence intervals, are now solicited.  We restrict our analysis to these forecasts 
and intervals. 
To gather more information on the participants, in September 2003 a demographic 
survey of participants was taken.  Most of the regular ZEW Finanzmarkttest 
participants responded to this survey (about 250 out of 350).  Thus, as of September 
2003, we know the gender, age, educational level, educational field and professional 
experience of respondents – as well as whether or not the forecasts are based on self-
                                           
3  The ifo Business Climate index is based on a survey of about 7,000 companies in Germany on 
their business expectations. Every month the ifo institute asks about 7,000 enterprises in 
manufacturing, construction, wholesaling and retailing to give their assessments of the current 
business situation and their expectations for the next six months. The enterprises can 
characterize their situation as “good,” “satisfactory” or “poor,” and their business expectations 
for the next six months as “more favorable,” “unchanged” or “more unfavorable.” 
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conducted research or whether they rely on others’ research.  Advantageously, the 
quantitative forecasts examined here are never more than 18 months away from 
when the demographic survey was conducted.  This mitigates substantially the 
problem of respondent changes.4  
Table 1 provides a demographic snapshot.  It is apparent that this group is 
predominately male and well-educated,5 tends to have had an educational 
specialization in economics or business, and does its own research.  On average the 
group has good experience in financial markets.  Since this will be a key variable in 
our analysis, we show the distribution of market experience in Figure 1.  Evidently 
there is a very broad range and the distribution is skewed to the right. 
3. Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis tested is a static one: 
Hypothesis 1: Market forecasters as a group are overconfident in their 
predictions. 
Since overconfidence seems to be so prevalent in society, the finding that it exists in 
this realm should not surprise us.  Still, we might expect only moderate levels of 
overconfidence since the respondents are able to fairly frequently assess how 
accurate their forecasts are.  Moreover those performing poorly are unlikely to have 
long careers and many in our sample do have extensive experience in financial 
markets. 
The next three hypotheses are dynamic in nature.  Hypotheses 2 and 3 focus on the 
cross section, with the former conditioning on forecasting success: 
Hypothesis 2:  Success, measured by recent forecast accuracy, increases 
overconfidence, while failure (less strongly) mitigates overconfidence.   
There is evidence that certain personal characteristics are correlated with 
overconfidence.  For example, males tend to be more overconfident than females 
(Lundeberg, Fox and Punccohar (1994), Beyer (1990), Barber and Odean (2001)).6  
                                           
4  While the questionnaire is sent to the same addresses every month, the person in the department 
filling it out and submitting the forecasts might change without ZEW being notified.  This 
potentially adds noise to our results. 
5  There are 30 Ph.D.s. 
6  Deaves, Lüders and Luo (2004) do not corroborate this finding, but this likely due to 
the fact that their female subjects are business students rather than belonging to a 
diverse group. 
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And Bhandari and Deaves (2005) find that highly-educated well-paid males are 
especially susceptible.  Past success is also argued (by Gervais and Odean (2001)) to 
increase overconfidence.  The thrust here is that past success triggers self-attribution 
bias that exacerbates overconfidence, while failures are in part ignored.   
Hypothesis 3:  Success, measured by experience in financial markets, increases 
overconfidence. 
Since survival in financial markets is a signal of persistent success, we would also 
expect a correlation between market experience and overconfidence.  Experience 
however should also engender wisdom, that is, a better sense of one’s limitations.  It 
is an empirical question as to which dominates.  Nevertheless, the model of Gervais 
and Odean (2001) suggests the latter is the weaker force, especially at low to 
moderate levels of experience. 
Hypothesis 4 is in terms of market-level overconfidence: 
Hypothesis 4:  Success at the level of the market, proxied by high lagged 
market returns, increases the average level of overconfidence. 
As mentioned earlier, Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2004) show that lagged 
market returns are correlated with increases in aggregate trading activity.  Volume 
however is only a proxy for overconfidence.  It is preferable to test this hypothesis 
directly by seeking to establish a linkage between past returns and measured 
overconfidence.  
4. Empirical results 
i. Hypothesis 1 
The respondents must produce 90% confidence intervals for the DAX six months in 
the future.  The obvious approach is to ascertain how often these intervals contain 
the eventually correct level of the DAX.  Unfortunately the direct route is not ideal.  
The forecasts, while made monthly, are for six months ahead.  If we use overlapping 
observations there will be a substantial amount of non-independence.  One surprise 
will have an impact on not just one forecast horizon but instead on six.  A purely 
cross-sectional approach does not help.  The problem is that a truly unexpected 
market event surprises not just one forecaster but everyone.  An alternative is to wait 
six months to see if individuals are right while eschewing overlapping observations.  
Unfortunately, for a barely minimal number of independent observations we would 
have to possess 10 years of data (as opposed to just over two years).   
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Two indirect tests of the hypothesis that forecasters are overconfident were carried 
out.  First, by examining a time series of the history of the DAX, we can ascertain 
how wide a 90% confidence interval should be.  We then compare the width of 
respondent confidence intervals to this ideal width.  If the typical width is too 
narrow relative to this ideal width, then we infer that forecasters are overconfident. 
More specifically, we calculate, at each forecast date, historical (based on half-year 
returns) 10-year rolling window standard deviations. An approximate 90% 
confidence interval width consistent with DAX history should be 2 * 1.645 * Current 
DAX * SD of DAX returns.7  So, at each forecast point, a comparison can be made 
between the average confidence interval width of respondents and what is suggested 
by the history of the DAX.  Figure 2 documents that the average interval of 
respondents is substantially narrower than what it should be as suggested by DAX 
history.8  Oddly, the divergence between the curves increases over the first year or 
so.  The interval based on history increases because the DAX increases dramatically 
over this period (e.g., 60% for the year ending March 2004), necessitating a 
commensurate interval expansion.  At the same time, the average interval among 
respondents declines over the first year.  This in fact offers preliminary support for 
Hypothesis 4 which calls for lagged returns and average overconfidence to be 
positively correlated.  We will return to this hypothesis later in the paper. 
Another approach for ascertaining overconfidence begins with inferring one-month 
forecast confidence intervals from six-month intervals based on a simple reasonable 
assumption, namely that forecasters believe that the growth rate in the DAX will be 
constant over the next six months.  More specifically, suppose a given forecaster 
provides L6, F6 and U6 for the 6-month interval lower bound, forecast point 
estimate and interval upper bound respectively.  From F6 the one-month forecast 
point estimate (F1) is calculated assuming constant growth in the DAX: 
1/ 66(1) 1 ( ) *FF Current DAX
Current DAX
=  
On the assumption of i.i.d. DAX 1-month returns, the standard deviation of 1-month 
returns is 1/√6 times the 6-month standard deviation.  Respondents have chosen their 
intervals to reflect what they perceive to be the correct number of standard 
deviations on each side of their point estimate, so all we have to do is multiply U6-
                                           
7  This is a conservative estimate.  As return distributions such as the DAX exhibit 
leptokurtosis the correct lower and upper limits based on a bootstrap would actually 
be wider. 
8  It should not be too surprising to hear that the gap between the two curves is always 
highly significant (p-value=0.000). 
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F6 and F6-L6 by 1/√6 to arrive at U1-F1 and F1-L1.  And since we have F1 it is 
straightforward to calculate L1 and U1.  Finally, using L1 and U1, we note whether 
or not the eventual realization of the DAX falls between the bounds.  Assuming our 
procedure is sound and respondents are well-calibrated, this should occur 90% of the 
time. 
Before providing the results, it should be noted that there was one complication that 
had to be addressed.  Respondents typically have about two weeks to make their 6-
month-ahead forecasts.  Since they are not told to do otherwise, logically 
respondents would be making their forecasts for exactly six months in the future.  
Using our 1-month interpolation procedure, our values are then appropriate for 
exactly one month in the future.  But one month in the future occurs on different 
dates for different people.  So what we in fact have to do is use respondent-specific 
“current” DAX values and compare intervals to respondent-specific “eventual” DAX 
values. 
What do the data tell us?  While respondents should be right 90% of the time, 
Figure 3 shows that in actual fact this occurs far less than that.9  Note that at best 
about 80% of respondents are “right,” and quite often less than 50% are right.  The 
inference once again is that our respondents are egregiously overconfident.   
It is also instructive to view overconfidence cross-sectionally.  In Figure 4, we show 
a frequency distribution of the percentage of times individuals are right over the full 
sample.  The mode suggests that many are right between 40%-70% of the time even 
though they are asked to be right 90% of the time.  Note the spikes on the endpoints.  
These two groups are dominated by people who answered the survey infrequently.  
For example, the 22 people who had 100% accuracy on average responded to the 
survey only twice (vs. an overall sample average of 16.7 times), suggesting that 
many of the apparently underconfident were in fact lucky.   
To sum up, using several (albeit imperfect) approaches, the survey data indicate that 
the market forecasters in our sample are egregiously (though perhaps not 
universally) overconfident. 
ii. Hypothesis 2  
The dynamics of individual overconfidence is approached in two ways.  To begin, 
we explore whether a successful forecast (in the sense that the confidence interval 
contains the eventual DAX value) in the most recent period leads to a narrowing of a 
respondent’s confidence interval in the following period.  Since overconfidence is 
                                           
9  For each date it can easily be rejected (with a p-value of 0.000) that the percentage of 
correct respondents is 90% or more. 
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the norm, a narrowing of intervals suggests increased overconfidence.  Using the 
technique described above, one-month intervals are inferred from 6-month intervals.  
Of course it is a leap in faith to suggest that respondents will “check” in a 
meaningful sense how well their implicit one-month forecasts performed and adjust 
behavior in response.  For this reason the associated noise might make it difficult to 
detect any innate dynamics.  
More specifically, regressions of the following form are run: 
, , 1(2 ) *i t i tC IR W a b R IG H T −∆ = +  
where ∆CIRWi,t is the change in the width of the confidence interval (relative to the 
cross-sectional average width) at time t for respondent i; and RIGHTi,t is an indicator 
variable equaling one when the respondent’s interval contains the eventual DAX 
value and zero otherwise.  Note that a equals the change based on wrong answers; 
and a+b equals the change for right answers. 
Panel A of Table 2 provides full-sample (panel) regression results.  Additionally, the 
full sample is partitioned into roughly equal subsamples.  For the full sample as well 
as for the first subperiod, there is extremely strong evidence that forecasters adjust 
the width of their confidence intervals based on how well their intervals performed 
in the previous month.10  Typically when respondents get it wrong, they expand their 
intervals; and when they get it right they contract their intervals.  Even for the 
second subperiod the evidence is fairly solid, in that the slope coefficient is still 
significant in the neighborhood of the 5% level. 
A few other salient points can be made.  First, these results are quite robust.  Cross-
sectional forecast-by-forecast regressions are run and the coefficient estimates are 
shown in Figure 5.  The intercept is positive 23 out of 25 times, and the slope is 
negative all but once.  In all but four cases, the absolute value of b is greater than 
that of a, which means that intervals contract after success (a+b<0) but expand after 
failure (a>0). 
Second, it is not possible to conclude that success has a greater impact than failure: 
interval contraction after success is about the same in magnitude as interval 
expansion after failure (since 2a is approximately equal to |b| for the full sample). 11  
Strictly speaking, this is inconsistent with self-attribution bias which argues that 
overconfidence increases with success but does not decline as much with failure. 
                                           
10  This is not the same as having accurate point estimates.  In fact when we regress 
confidence interval changes on accuracy in this sense the coefficient is insignificant. 
11  It is not possible to reject the hypothesis that 2a+b=0. 
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Third, despite the highly significant slope coefficients, the R-squared’s are quite low 
in these regressions, which of course means that relative confidence interval widths 
are changing for a variety of other (unknown) reasons.  The fact that we had to 
impute 1-month intervals from 6-month obviously exacerbates the problem.  
Nevertheless, quite reliably, success, or its absence, is an important force. 
Fourth, the Bayesian reader may argue that the direction of confidence interval 
changes is a logical response to new information and thus is not necessarily 
indicative of increases in overconfidence.  A signal (a “right” answer) that one is a 
good forecaster would seem to imply that confidence intervals should contract.  
There is a problem, however, with this view, as revealed by Table 3, which provides 
prior (over all previous months) and subsequent-month success rates for those who 
were right or wrong in the current month.12  Trivially, in a month where someone 
gets it right, she could be said to be “underconfident” since one was asked to be 
right 90%, not all the time (one of one).  So it is possible to argue that the “right” 
group intervals are being contracted to move things towards proper 90% calibration.  
Focus on the third and sixth columns though.  In the months prior to the successful 
forecast (column 3) nowhere near 90% of these people got it right; and their lack of 
success holds up in the subsequent month (column 6).13  This suggests of course that 
if they contracted their intervals they were unwise to do so – unless (oddly) the 
impact accorded the last observation in the Bayesian updating is excessive. 
iii. Hypothesis 3 
Next we look at the dynamics of individual overconfidence in a different way.  One 
problem with the previous dynamic approach is that it relies on respondents 
“checking” their forecasts.  The variant of the second hypothesis focusing on 
financial market experience does not however require this.  As mentioned earlier, a 
one-time demographic survey was conducted in September 2003 of the ZEW 
Finanzmarkttest survey participants, with about 70% of survey respondents 
participating in this “extra” task.  Conveniently, one of the questions was years of 
experience working in financial markets.  Recall that the model of Gervais and 
Odean (2001) implies that experience, at least up to a point, will exacerbate 
overconfidence. 
We next explore this, but at the same time we can broaden our focus.  First, it is 
possible to partition overconfidence into certainty (that is, confidence as opposed to 
                                           
12  Current month success rates are definitionally 0% and 100% for the two groups. 
13  The last several months are an exception, as three out of six times the “right” group 
gets it right at a rate of 89% or better in the subsequent month.   
  11
overconfidence) and knowledge.14  Only if the former exceeds the latter is one 
overconfident.  Second, given our demographic data, we are also able to investigate 
whether other demographic factors have an impact on overconfidence (as well as on 
certainty and knowledge individually).  The other demographic factors of interest 
are age, gender, educational level, area of study and whether or not one generated 
the forecast oneself.   
In Table 4 we report the results of cross-sectional regressions on experience and 
age.15  To more specifically define our dependent variables, certainty is expressed in 
terms of an individual’s confidence interval width relative to the cross-sectional 
average at each point in time.  We then take a time series average to obtain an 
individual-specific average relative confidence interval width.  The greater is this 
value, the less confident (or certain) is the individual.  Thus the following metric for 
confidence is appropriate: 
( )(3)
( ) ( )
i
i
Max Avg rel conf range width Avg rel conf range widthCertainty
Max Avg rel conf range width Min Avg rel conf range width
−= −
 
Knowledge is based on average absolute forecast errors scaled by DAX realizations.  
It is defined as follows: 
( )(4)
( ) ( )
i
i
Max Avg abs scaled fore error Avg abs scaled fore errorKnowledge
Max Avg abs scaled fore error Min Avg abs scaled fore error
−= −
Note that, for both formulas above, the metrics are bounded between zero and unity, 
and the max and min are over the cross section.   
Finally, overconfidence is one minus the percentage of the time that an individual’s 
interval contains the eventual DAX realization.  A value of .1 would reflect neither 
underconfidence nor overconfidence, but values above this threshold reflect 
overconfidence. 
Focusing first on the simple regressions where years of experience is the sole 
independent variable, it is apparent that, consistent with the model of Gervais and 
Odean (2001), experience is detrimental in that it increases overconfidence.  To 
                                           
14  In Bhandari and Deaves (2005), due to how overconfidence was defined, it was 
possible to make the metric for overconfidence exactly equal to the difference between 
the metrics for certainty and knowledge.  Unfortunately this is not possible here. 
15  For the two knowledge regressions, heteroscedasticity could not be rejected (based on 
White tests) at conventional levels, so reported standard errors are consistent in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. 
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interpret, three additional years of experience increase overconfidence by 1.2% (that 
is, one is likely to have 1.2% fewer intervals right).  Is it deteriorating knowledge or 
a tendency to increase certainty that leads to additional overconfidence?  Note that 
self-attribution bias would be more consistent with the latter, but our results are 
otherwise.  The only significant coefficient is on knowledge, with the interpretation 
here being that five more years of experience drops someone down 1% in the 
knowledge ranking.  How can this be explained?  Perhaps job experience is a 
double-edged sword.  On the one hand, additional years on the job should lead to 
greater wisdom.  On the other hand, human nature is such that effort declines with 
maturity.  Our evidence suggests that the second effect outweighs the first, causing 
more experienced people to display lower levels of knowledge (accuracy). 
One might question whether it is job experience or age that drives the results.  Not 
surprisingly the two are highly correlated (.85).  To resolve this issue, Table 4 also 
provides regression results where age – orthogonalized so that only its component 
independent of job experience can have an impact – is included as a second 
regressor.  Clearly age adds nothing. 
Finally (not shown in Table 4) we also perform multivariate regressions of certainty, 
knowledge and overconfidence on all the demographic variables of interest (not just 
the two shown in the table).  In all cases, the additional regressors are safely 
insignificant, while the impact of financial market experience is easily retained.16       
iv. Hypothesis 4   
Finally, we examine the dynamics of market-wide overconfidence.  Specifically, we 
investigate whether high recent market returns make the market more overconfident.  
First, begin with Panel B of Table 2 which investigates individual-level changes in 
overconfidence as a function of individual forecasting success or failure (as in Panel 
A) and lagged market returns.  The p-values for the latter are never close to 
indicating significance.   
A decomposition of the variance of the full panel of imputed one-month confidence 
intervals indicates that most of the variability is cross-sectional.  Only 4% of the 
overall variance is accounted for by variability in the time series average.  This 
suggests that we are more likely to find an impact on aggregate overconfidence if 
our dependent variable is the change in the average confidence interval width. 
                                           
16  It may be a little surprising that gender does not impact overconfidence.  This is partly 
due to the small percentage of females in the sample (see Table 1) and the fact that 
females in the forecasting field are likely a more overconfident group than the general 
female population (see footnote 6). 
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Table 5 indicates that this is indeed the case.  Begin with the first regression which 
investigates whether average overconfidence increases with the percentage of 
respondents who are right.  This is analogous to Panel A of Table 2 but with 
averaging over all individuals.  There is no discernible impact.  The second 
regression includes as an additional regressor the most recent one-month DAX 
return.  Despite the very sparse number of time series observations, one can 
comfortably conclude that high past market returns push the entire market towards 
greater overconfidence.  Interestingly, further regressions show that the impact of 
history is short-lived.  It should be stressed that, while this result is consistent with 
the  work of Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2004) and Glaser and Weber (2004), it 
constitutes direct evidence in contrast to their more indirect evidence.  
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to explore the statics and dynamics of 
overconfidence.  Overconfidence is proxied by miscalibration.  We find that the 
Finanzmarkttest respondent group as a whole is egregiously overconfident.  More 
interestingly, they do not seem learn from past successes and failures, or from 
experience.  This flaw is also present at the level of the market as we see that high 
past returns induce increased aggregate overconfidence. All of this suggests that 
overconfidence is not only a pervasive phenomenon, but it is also one that is 
exceedingly difficult to eliminate. 
While respondents alter their intervals dependably based on past success or failure, 
the low level of explanatory power suggests that there are other forces inducing 
changes in behavior.  Indeed, an exploration into the nature of these additional 
factors would be a worthwhile avenue for future research. 
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Appendix 
Table 1:  Demographic characteristics of survey respondents 
 Mean Median Min Max SD N 
Age 42 42 24 65 8.7 236 
Gender 
(male=1) 
.95 1 0 1 .21 244 
Years in 
financial markets 
15 13 1 45 9.6 241 
Own research? 
(yes=1) 
.82 1 0 1 .39 240 
Education 
(university equivalent=1) 
.58 1 0 1 .49 244 
Field 
(economics/business =1) 
.95 1 0 1 .22 199 
 
 
Table 2:  Panel regressions of changes in relative confidence interval width on previous 
forecasting success and previous DAX returns 
, , 1 1* *i t i t tCIRW a b RIGHT c DAX− −∆ = + +  
 obs a b C Adjusted R2 
Panel A 
Full sample 
 
4966 0.046 
(0.001) 
-0.090 
(0.000) 
 
 0.004 
2003:03-
2004:03 
2737 0.048 
(0.000) 
-0.103 
(0.000) 
 
 0.016 
2004:04-
2005:03 
2229 0.043 
(0.000) 
-0.075 
(0.052) 
 
 0.001 
Panel B 
Full sample 
 
4966 0.047 
(0.001) 
-0.090 
(0.000) 
 
-0.049 
(0.772) 
0.004 
2003:03-
2004:03 
2737 0.049 
(0.000) 
-0.103 
(0.000) 
 
-0.041 
(0.712) 
0.016 
2004:04-
2005:03 
2229 0.043 
(0.133) 
-0.075 
(0.053) 
 
0.011 
(0.985) 
0.001 
Note: P-values are in brackets below coefficient estimates. 
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Table 3:  Prior/subsequent success rates of right/ wrong 
 
Prior month 
forecast accuracy 
Subsequent month 
forecast accuracy 
Month 
Wrong 
group 
(current 
month) 
Right 
group 
(current 
month) Diff. 
Wrong 
group 
(current 
month) 
Right 
group 
(current 
month) Diff. 
2003:03 22.2% 42.7% 20.4% 29.1% 39.2% 10.2% 
2003:04 34.1% 30.8% -3.3% 62.2% 83.1% 20.9% 
2003:05 21.8% 37.8% 15.9% 25.8% 50.3% 24.6% 
2003:06 36.1% 48.8% 12.7% 49.2% 82.1% 32.9% 
2003:07 38.9% 42.4% 3.4% 46.8% 66.4% 19.6% 
2003:08 37.5% 48.9% 11.5% 49.4% 47.7% -1.7% 
2003:09 45.0% 49.9% 5.0% 25.9% 24.7% -1.2% 
2003:10 44.2% 53.3% 9.1% 62.5% 82.0% 19.5% 
2003:11 37.6% 48.0% 10.4% 35.1% 61.0% 25.9% 
2003:12 43.1% 49.9% 6.8% 78.1% 71.8% -6.3% 
2004:01 44.2% 50.0% 5.8% 24.5% 49.4% 24.8% 
2004:02 50.6% 52.3% 1.7% 56.6% 50.0% -6.6% 
2004:03 46.5% 50.7% 4.2% 32.7% 32.8% 0.0% 
2004:04 49.1% 52.5% 3.4% 67.6% 61.8% -5.7% 
2004:05 40.2% 52.1% 11.9% 44.4% 42.9% -1.6% 
2004:06 46.7% 54.0% 7.3% 2.8% 20.5% 17.7% 
2004:07 48.7% 65.2% 16.5% 50.0% 57.1% 7.1% 
2004:08 41.0% 51.6% 10.6% 55.1% 72.1% 17.0% 
2004:09 40.2% 50.6% 10.4% 65.8% 89.1% 23.2% 
2004:10 41.1% 50.3% 9.3% 32.5% 54.2% 21.7% 
2004:11 44.4% 54.9% 10.5% 42.9% 91.4% 48.5% 
2004:12 37.0% 54.7% 17.7% 43.3% 94.2% 50.9% 
2005:01 37.1% 55.0% 17.9% 56.3% 81.4% 25.2% 
2005:02 43.7% 54.0% 10.3% 61.4% 81.5% 20.0% 
Note: Percentages indicate how often the relevant group at the relevant time got a forecast right.  
Whether or not one belongs to the “right” or “wrong” group is a function of the forecast only in the 
current month. 
  16
Table 4:  Certainty, knowledge and overconfidence vs. experience and age 
i i iD V =a+b*Years in m arkets + c*Age  
Dependent 
variable (DV) 
a 
(p-value) 
b 
(p-value) 
c 
(p-value) 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
Observations 
      
Certainty 3.031 
(.000) 
.0008 
(.280) 
--- .004 
(.001) 
239 
 2.989 
(.000) 
-.0004 
(.827) 
.0015 
(.410) 
.007 
(-.002) 
231 
      
Knowledge -0.105 
(.000) 
-.0019 
(.034) 
--- .050 
(.046) 
240 
 -0.096 
(.000) 
-.0017 
(.095) 
-.0002 
(.806) 
.052 
(.044) 
232 
      
Overconfidence 0.431 
(.000) 
.0041 
(.002) 
--- .040 
(.036) 
239 
 0.495 
(.000) 
.0058 
(.027) 
-.0022 
(.451) 
.042 
(.034) 
231 
Note: For the knowledge regressions above, it was not possible to reject heteroskedasticity at 
conventional significance levels (based on the White test), so reported p-values (below coefficient 
estimates) are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 5:  Time series regressions of changes in average confidence interval width on past 
DAX returns and previous average forecasting success 
1 1 2 3* * * *t t t t tACIW a b PRIGHT c DAX d DAX e DAX− − − −∆ = + + + +  
Sample a b c d e Adj. R2 
2003:03-
2005:03 
-0.005 
(0. 273) 
0.002 
(0.784) 
   -0.040 
2003:03-
2005:03 
-0.004 
(0.350) 
0.002 
(0.751) 
-0.057 
(0.028) 
  0.132 
2003:03-
2005:03 
-0.003 
(0.450) 
0.001 
(0.880) 
-0.057 
(0.031) 
0.007 
(0.798) 
 0.093 
2003:03-
2005:03 
-0.003 
(0.465) 
0.001 
(0.898) 
-0.058 
(0.034) 
0.006 
(0.822) 
0.006 
(0.777) 
0.052 
Note: P-values are in brackets below coefficient estimates. 
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Figure 1:  Frequency distribution for years of experience in financial markets 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 10 20 30 40
 
 
Figure 2:  Average respondent confidence interval (solid line) vs. interval suggested by DAX 
history (broken line) 
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Figure 3:  Percentage of time that respondents’ intervals contain eventual value of DAX 
(time series) 
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Figure 4:  Percentage of time that respondents’ intervals contain eventual value of DAX 
(cross-sectional) 
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Figure 5: Month-by-month intercept and slope coefficients for regression of changes in 
relative confidence interval width on previous forecasting success 
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